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Automated driving is getting increasingly more attention. More and more cars are equipped with self-driving 
features and fully automated driving is getting closer to reality by the day. Trials with self-driving vehicles are 
currently taking place across the globe. However, before handing over control to the automated vehicle, there are 
challenges to overcome. These are not only technical challenges but also legal challenges. Although the driver 
becomes redundant from a technical perspective, from a legal perspective this is not the case. Laws will have to 
be adjusted to accommodate this new technology. This paper will give a short overview of the legal challenges 
ahead, especially the challenges regarding technical regulations, traffic laws and liability. 
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As trials with (semi) autonomous vehicles are taking place across the globe, a driverless future is getting closer 
to reality. For a driverless future to become reality, however, there are not only technical hurdles but also legal 
challenges to overcome. For instance, traffic laws are based on the notion that a human driver is necessary in 
order to drive the vehicle. If the human driver becomes redundant, these laws will have to be adjusted to allow 
driverless vehicles to drive on public roads. The transition to a driverless era will not happen overnight. 
Therefore, laws will also have to accommodate different levels of automation, from the situation where a 
conventional driver is driving the vehicle up to the situation where a vehicle can operate completely independent.  
 
These different levels of automation are described by SAE International (SAE International (2016)). SAE 
International makes a distinction between six levels of automation, ranging from Level 0 (no driving automation) 
to level 5 (full driving automation). Vehicles up to Level 2 (partial driving automation) are already on the public 
roads today. These vehicles are able to perform a part of the driving task. For example, the vehicle stays within 
its own lane (lane keeping) or keeps a set speed and is able to adjust its speed to keep a safe distance from the 
vehicles driving in front of it (adaptive cruise control). Vehicles from Level 3 onwards are capable of performing 
the entire driving task, but up to Level 4 a human driver should be able to intervene under certain circumstances. 
A person needs to intervene when a problem occurs or when the situation that the vehicle can handle itself – for 
instance driving on a highway – comes to an end. A Level 4 vehicle needs to be able to bring itself to a safe stop 
if the person fails to respond to a request to intervene. A Level 3 vehicle disengages after an appropriate time 
after issuing the request to intervene, it does not achieve a minimal risk condition like a Level 4 vehicle. No 
human interference is necessary at the highest level of automation, Level 5 (full driving automation). The person 
using a Level 5 vehicle no longer needs to keep his eyes on the road, ready to take over the driving task. This 
person can read a book, write an email, or sleep while the vehicle is driving him to his destination. 
 
From a legal perspective, vehicles up to Level 3 have a driver, a human that determines speed and direction of 
the vehicle, that observes the traffic situation and makes decisions based upon those observations (all the driving 
tasks). The driver using a Level 3 vehicle must always be ready to intervene. When the self-driving vehicle 
system of a Level 4 vehicle is not engaged, a person needs to perform the driving tasks just like a conventional 
driver. This person is at that moment the driver of the Level 4 vehicle. If the vehicle system is engaged, the 
person using the vehicle does not perform the driving tasks, the self-driving vehicle system performs the driving 
tasks. It is no longer clear if, from a legal perspective, such a Level 4 vehicle with the self-driving vehicle system 
engaged still has a driver. After all, there is no longer a person that needs to perform a driving task. The same 
goes for a Level 5 vehicle, where the vehicle system performs the driving tasks during the whole trip. 
 
The absence of the conventional driver gives rise to several legal questions, most importantly regarding technical 
regulations, traffic laws and liability. In all these fields the conventional driver plays an important role in 
legislation. Rules are addressed to the driver and duties are laid upon the driver. In technical regulations 
reference is made to the driver for instance in provisions regarding the position of steering equipment. Traffic 
laws include duties of conduct addressed to the driver, for example, on which side of the road to drive on. And 
depending on national liability laws, the driver will have to pay damages to compensate for the damage he 
caused whilst driving. 
 
Road safety should be the starting point when answering the legal questions regarding the absence of the driver 
as technical regulations, traffic laws and liability laws all aim to increase road safety. Technical regulations do so 
by laying down minimum requirements for vehicles, traffic laws by providing rules of conduct and liability laws 
by, in case it does go wrong, allocating the damage from the victims to the perpetrator. This can have a deterrent 
effect and therefore stimulate safe behavior. The aim when adjusting (if indeed necessary) laws to autonomous 
vehicles should therefore be not to adversely affect road traffic safety in doing so. 
 
In this paper several legal questions regarding self-driving vehicles (Level 4 and Level 5) and technical 
regulations (section 2), traffic laws (section 3) and liability laws (section 4) will be discussed. Some other legal 
questions will be touched upon briefly in section 5. However, this is not a complete overview of all the legal 
questions surrounding automated driving. 
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2. Technical regulations 
References to a driver are made in technical regulations. Take for instance the UN Regulations, which are 
addenda to the 1958 Agreement concerning the Adoption of Uniform Prescriptions. These UN Regulations – of 
which there are more than 160 – cover a wide array of subjects like the steering mechanism, rear marking plates 
for slow-moving vehicles, the strength of the seats, braking, the heating system, the recyclability of motor 
vehicles, and so on. References to the driver are made throughout the UN Regulations. An example of this can 
be found in the description of the characteristics of the braking systems: 
 
“There shall be at least two controls, independent of each other and readily accessible to the driver from his 
normal driving position. Every brake control shall be designed such that it returns to the fully off position when 
released. This requirement shall not apply to a parking brake control when it is mechanically locked in an 
applied position;(…)” (Regulation No. 13-H.) 
 
When self-driving vehicles make the human driver redundant, how can these technical regulations apply? Self-
driving vehicles will have to comply with technical regulations, just like a conventional vehicle. New provisions 
will need to be drafted, other provisions might still apply to automated vehicles. Regarding some regulations a 
novel interpretation might provide a solution. Google raised this issue in the United States on the interpretation 
of the American Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). Google asked the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) if regarding some FMVSS the self-driving vehicle system could be deemed to 
be the driver of the vehicle. One of the provisions discussed by the NHTSA is FMVSS no. 101 section 5.1.1: 
 
“S5.1.1 The controls listed in Table 1 and in Table 2 must be located so they are operable by the driver under the 
conditions of S5.6.2.” 
 
Table 1 and table 2 list controls and telltales like turn signals, the windshield wiping system, brake system 
malfunction, fuel level, engine start control and the horn. Google argues that these controls are operable for the 
self-driving system. For the purpose of S5.1.1, the NHTSA interprets the self-driving vehicle system to be the 
driver. The NHTSA states that it is more reasonable to identify the driver as whatever, not whoever, is doing the 
driving. In case of a self-driving vehicle, this is the self-driving vehicle system. The NHTSA reaches the same 
conclusion regarding several other FMVSS. Such an interpretation can also provide a solution for the UN 
Regulations, like the example on the characteristics for braking systems mentioned above. On the other hand, 
interpretation can also lead to unclear results. Therefore, on the longer term, new legislation might be needed. 
3. Traffic laws 
3.1. Old rules, new technology 
Questions also arise regarding traffic rules. These questions have an international dimension as a lot of national 
traffic laws are based on two conventions of the United Nations: the Geneva Convention on Road Traffic of 
1949 and the Vienna Convention on road traffic of 1968. Both Conventions were established to promote 
international traffic and to increase road safety through adoption of these uniform rules. The Conventions entail 
both rules of conduct and technical provisions. The general view expressed in literature is that a vehicle cannot 
be allowed onto the public roads if it cannot comply with the rules of conduct, even though it does not violate the 
technical provisions (Van Wees 2015). The Conventions both date back to a time where self-driving vehicles 
were not much more than a dream or perhaps something you would see in a movie. It is therefore not surprising 
that the self-driving vehicle was not taken into consideration while drafting these Conventions (Smith (2014)).  
What role does the notion of driver play in these Conventions? 
3.2. A moving vehicle has a driver who is able to control his vehicle 
Both the Geneva Convention and the Vienna Convention clearly state that every vehicle should have a driver 
(article 8 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention; article 8 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention). This driver should be able 
to control his vehicle (article 8 paragraph 5 Geneva Convention; article 8 paragraph 5 and article 13 paragraph 1 
Vienna Convention). Both Conventions also provide a definition for the term ‘driver’. According to article 4 of 
the Geneva Convention ‘driver’ means “any person who drives a vehicle, including cycles, or guides draught, 
pack or saddle animals or herds or flocks on a road, or who is in actual physical control of the same (…)”. The 
definition given by the Vienna Convention differs from the definition given by the Geneva Convention. This 
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definition (article 1 (v) Vienna Convention) reads: ““Driver” means any person who drives a motor vehicle or 
other vehicle (including a cycle), or who guides cattle, singly or in herds, or flocks, or draught, pack or saddle 
animals on a road (…)”. 
 
Although the Conventions revolve around the notion of driver, this does not necessarily have to be a problem 
when the human driver becomes redundant. Some traffic rules might still be applicable to self-driving vehicles. 
However, some traffic rules will no longer be relevant in a driverless era or might even inhibit self-driving 
vehicles from driving on public roads. What problems occur when vehicles become driverless? A selection of 
provisions from both Conventions will be discussed below to illustrate this. 
3.2.1. Headlights 
Article 15 paragraph 1, first sentence, of the Geneva Convention is on the lights of a vehicle: “From nightfall and 
during the night, or when atmospheric conditions render it necessary, every vehicle or combination of vehicles 
on a road shall show at least one white light in front and at least one red light in the rear.(…).” This technical 
rule of the road can still apply to autonomous vehicles, whether the car drives itself or is driven by a 
conventional driver is not relevant regarding this provision. 
3.2.2. Opening of doors 
Article 24 of the Vienna Convention reads: “It shall be prohibited to open the door of a vehicle, to leave it open, 
or to alight from the vehicle without having made sure that to do so cannot endanger other road-users.” This 
provision is not addressed to someone specific, for instance ‘the driver’. When applying this provision to a 
driverless vehicle this would mean that the car itself can not automatically open its doors without having made 
sure that doing so cannot endanger other road-users. Applying the provision to a self-driving vehicle does not 
lead to unclear results. Therefore it does not need to be adjusted to an era without the conventional driver. 
3.2.3. Driving permit 
The provisions on driving permits (article 24-25 Geneva Convention, article 41-43 Vienna Convention) will 
remain relevant during the transition period. These provisions entail that every driver of a motor vehicle should 
hold a driving permit. It can be argued that, because a Level 5 vehicle (or the self-driving vehicle system) 
performs all the driving tasks without human interference, the vehicle (or the vehicle system) is the driver of this 
vehicle. Does this mean that a self-driving vehicle would also need to hold a driving permit (Sivak and Schoettle 
(2015))? This is somewhat hard to imagine, especially when the self-driving vehicle will already be approved 
before being allowed on to the public roads. 
3.2.4. Distracted driving 
Article 8 paragraph 6 of the Vienna Convention states that drivers should minimize any activity other than 
driving. The use of a mobile phone while driving is explicitly addressed in this provision: the national legislator 
should prohibit drivers to use a hand-held phone while the vehicle is in motion. Can a user of a Level 5 vehicle, 
who only determines the destination and the moment the trip commences, be regarded to be the driver of that 
vehicle? If that would be the case, he is not allowed to use his mobile phone during the trip and he should 
minimize all other activities other than driving. So no reading, eating, working or sleeping during the trip. This 
would take away many of the benefits of a Level 5 vehicle.  
3.2.5. Overtaking 
Some provisions are addressed directly to the driver. An example of this is article 11 of the Vienna Convention 
(see also article 11 of the Geneva Convention). Paragraph 1 of this article reads: 
 
“Drivers overtaking shall do so on the side opposite to that appropriate to the direction of traffic.” 
 
This paragraph describes the duty a driver has when overtaking. If there is no longer a person behind the wheel 
but the vehicle itself performs the driving tasks, who or what has this duty than? This depends on who or what is 
the driver. Perhaps the definitions of the notion of driver given in the Conventions offer such room for 
interpretation that a self-driving vehicle (system) is also to be regarded to be the driver, similar to the 
interpretation of several FMVSS by the NHTSA mentioned above. This option will be explored further in the 
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following section. 
3.3. Who or what drives a driverless vehicle? 
The questions on the applicability of the provisions on driving permits, overtaking, and distracted driving to 
autonomous vehicles all boil down to one question: who or what is the driver? As mentioned above, perhaps the 
Conventions can be interpreted in such a way that the driver is not only the human sitting behind the wheel, but 
also the self-driving vehicle system.  
3.3.1. A legal person behind the wheel? 
Of course, the conventional driver fulfils the definitions given in the Conventions. This conventional driver is the 
human sitting in the driver’s seat with his hands on the steering wheel and ready to use the brake or accelerator 
pedal. However, the Conventions speak of ‘any person’, not explicitly about a human (Smith (2014)). This leads 
to the question if perhaps a legal person, who has rights and duties just like a human, can be the driver of a motor 
vehicle. This legal person could for example be the company providing the software of the self-driving car. It 
can be argued that such a software company does the same as a conventional driver: it determines speed and 
direction of the vehicle and it makes strategic decisions by programming the software a certain way. However, 
when considering the whole Conventions, it becomes clear that the traffic rules in the Conventions are not fully 
applicable to a legal person. Take for instance the examples on overtaking, distracted driving and driving 
permits: those provisions have clearly been drafted with a human driver – the conventional driver – in mind. 
3.3.2. Is the vehicle system the driver? 
As mentioned above, the NHTSA deems the self-driving vehicle system to be the driver regarding several 
FMVSS. The NHTSA sees it as more reasonable to identify the driver as whatever, not whoever, is doing the 
driving. After all, if the vehicle system is able to determine the lateral and longitudinal direction of the vehicle, 
has situational awareness and is capable of responding to that situation, the vehicle system performs the 
complete driving task like a conventional driver. Does the same reasoning apply to the provisions in the Geneva 
Convention and the Vienna Convention? Given the definition of driver in both Conventions, the driver is ‘any 
person’ that drives the vehicle. This would exclude the vehicle system from being a driver, because the vehicle 
system can hardly be regarded to be a legal person (having rights and obligations) or a human.  
 
If, however, the definition of driver would be omitted from the Conventions through amending the Conventions, 
this would provide room for interpreting (article 31-33 Vienna Convention of the law of treaties) the term 
‘driver’ in other provisions of the Conventions as being the vehicle system (Smith (2014)). A driver could then 
be interpreted as whatever is doing the driving, the same approach as NHTSA took regarding the FMVSS. There 
is however an important difference between the ‘driver’ in technical regulations and the ‘driver’ as used in traffic 
laws like the Conventions; the notion of ‘driver’ has a different role in these Conventions. In technical 
regulations the term ‘driver’ is used to determine the object in the car that will perform the driving task. This 
driver does not have any rights or duties. This is different from the use of the notion of ‘driver’ in traffic laws: 
here the driver does have rights and duties. For instance, the driver has the obligation to keep sufficient distance 
from the vehicle travelling in front of him (article 13 paragraph 4 Vienna Convention) and he should avoid 
driving behaviour likely to endanger pedestrians (article 21 paragraph 1 Vienna Convention). Some of these 
obligations, like keeping sufficient distance, can be fulfilled by a vehicle system. Other obligations cannot be 
easily met by the vehicle system.  
3.3.3. Is the person using the self-driving vehicle the driver of this vehicle? 
Another option that needs further exploring is if the person who uses the self-driving vehicle, by setting the 
destination and switching on the vehicle system, can be regarded to be the driver of the vehicle.  
 
The definitions of the term ‘driver’ given in the Conventions state that any person “who drives” a vehicle is to be 
regarded to be the driver of that vehicle (article 4 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention; article 1(v) Vienna 
Convention). Does the user ‘drive’ the vehicle by determining its destination and pressing the start button? The 
answer to this question depends on how ‘driving’ is to be interpreted, as neither Convention provides for a 
definition of ‘driving’. For the interpretation of the term ‘driving’, the distinction between role of the 
conventional driver and the role of the conventional passenger could provide a clue. Neither Convention 
provides a definition for passenger, but it appears from the overall Conventions that the persons inside the 
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vehicle that do not in any way contribute to the movements of the vehicle – they do not touch the steering wheel, 
nor the gas pedal or other equipment necessary for determining the movements of the vehicle – are regarded 
passengers. The passengers are passive. The conventional driver, on the other hand, is actively involved in 
determining the vehicle’s speed, direction and he makes strategic decisions based on his observations (stopping 
for a red traffic light, giving way, slowing down around schools, etc.). The driver should perform all of these 
driving tasks, but if he no longer performs (one of) these task, for instance because he gets distracted, he remains 
the driver. After all, every moving vehicle has a driver (article 8 paragraph 1 Geneva Convention; article 8 
paragraph 1 Vienna Convention). One way to look at this is that the distracted driver remains the driver of the 
vehicle because he has the intention to drive. This distinguishes the driver form the passenger; the passenger has 
no intention to drive. It can also be argued that the distracted driver remains the driver because he is the one who 
should have been performing the driving tasks (see for instance regarding Dutch law: Vellinga, Vellinga and Van 
Wees (2016), Hamer and Van Poelgeest (2006)). It is important to note that the Conventions do not state that the 
driver should be in control of its vehicle at all times. Instead, the Conventions state that the driver “shall at all 
times be able to control his vehicle” (article 8 paragraph 5 Geneva Convention; article 8 paragraph 5 Vienna 
Convention).This implies that at times the driver does not have to be in control (Smith (2014)). 
  
With regards to the question if the user of the autonomous vehicle can be regarded to be the driver of the vehicle, 
a distinction between Level 4 and Level 5 vehicles needs to be made. 
 
Level 4 vehicles can either be driven by the person using the vehicle and by the vehicle system. When the person 
using the car is driving – determining speed, direction and making strategic decisions – the situation does not 
differ from the conventional situation of a conventional car driven by a conventional driver. Therefore, for this 
part of the journey the user can be characterized as the driver. Once this user switches on the self-driving system, 
for instance on the highway, it becomes less clear if this person is still the driver. The user hands over control to 
the vehicle system for the time he sees fit. If he wants to reassume control, he can. The user can at all times take 
the driving into his own hands again. So, the user can still fulfil all driving tasks. But does he still have the 
intention to drive, or does he have the intention to let the vehicle system do the driving? 
 
Regarding level 5 vehicles, the position of the user is much clearer. The user has no intention to drive, he has the 
intention to let the vehicle system do the driving for him. After all, that is the whole goal of a Level 5 vehicle: 
letting the system drive, not the user. So, the user of Level 5 vehicles is not the driver of such a vehicle. 
If this interpretation is the interpretation the parties tend towards, remains to be seen. In the United Nations 
Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety (Working Party 1), which primary function it is to serve as guardian of the 
United Nations legal instruments aimed at harmonizing traffic rules, discussion on the interpretation of the 
Conventions is ongoing. 
3.4. The Conventions and the driverless future 
The aforementioned Working Party 1 is exploring how the Conventions can keep up with the technological 
developments. The discussion on the interpretation is ongoing (WP.1 (2016), article 31-33 Vienna Convention of 
the law of treaties). A broader interpretation of terms like ‘driver’ could accommodate some technical 
developments under the Conventions (Smith (2014)). Through interpretation, the Conventions can be updated 
without having to go through a lengthy process of amending the Conventions (article 31 Geneva Convention; 
article 49 Vienna Convention). However, this flexibility comes with legal uncertainty. Changing interpretation 
causes uncertainty for, for instance, vehicle manufacturers: what should their vehicle be able to do, should there 
be a possibility for a human to intervene? 
 
Another way to keep the Conventions in check with technological developments is amending the Conventions. 
This would provide for legal certainty and can be more selective than interpretation (for instance amending one 
specific provision instead of a novel interpretation of a term that can affect the whole convention). It is however 
not very suitable to quickly react to the newest technological developments as amending the Conventions is a 
time-consuming process. It could also be difficult to predict how the Conventions should be amended, as the 
technological developments are hard to predict. 
 
Working Party one is also exploring the possibility to create a non-binding advisory instrument or Resolution, 
which would serve both Conventions (ECE/TRANS/WP.1/157, nr 22, WP.1 (2017c)). The discussion on these 
legal instruments and on what they should entail is still ongoing. 
Nynke E. Vellinga / TRA2018, Vienna, Austria, April 16-19, 2018 
 
4. Liability 
One of the major questions raised by the arrival of autonomous vehicles is the one on liability: who is to be held 
liable for damage caused by the self-driving vehicle? If an accident between two conventional vehicles occurs, 
one of the drivers is often blamed for it. The driver could have overlooked the other vehicle, or maybe he 
ignored a red traffic light. This driver will have to compensate for the damage he caused to the other party. The 
situation will become more complicated if it was a self-driving vehicle overlooking the other vehicle or ignoring 
the red traffic light. There is no longer a conventional driver who responded to the situation; the self-driving 
vehicle responded to the situation. 
 
Who is to be held liable for damage caused by the self-driving vehicle is mainly determined by national law (see 
for instance Van Dam (2013)). Therefore, this article will only give a short overview of possible stakeholders 
that could be held liable for damage or personal injury caused by a self-driving vehicle. This will be done from a 
Dutch (and European) perspective, as the author has a background in Dutch law. 
4.1. Liability of the driver or user of the self-driving vehicle 
Can the person using the self-driving vehicle (Level 4 or Level 5) be held liable? After all, if this user had not 
summoned the vehicle to drive to a certain destination the accident would probably have never occurred. It can 
be argued that the user accepted the risks inherent to an autonomous vehicle; now the risks have realized the user 
should be held liable for the damage. Or perhaps the user did not override the system even though he had the 
possibility to do so (Marchant and Lindor (2012)). On the other hand, the user could not in any way influence the 
driving behaviour of the vehicle (unless there is an emergency brake in the vehicle, omitting operating this 
emergency brake could also lead to liability) and the user could have had the legitimate expectation the vehicle 
was able to handle the particular situation.  
4.2. Liability of the owner of the vehicle 
Although the owner or holder of the self-driving vehicle might not have been using the vehicle when the 
accident occurred, he could still be liable under certain circumstances (Schrader (2015), Engelhard (2017), 
Schellekens (2015)). For instance, depending on national legislation, the owner of the vehicle could be liable if 
he has not maintained his vehicle. He could be held liable if he failed to replace a broken sensor if this broken 
sensor was the cause of the accident. Or perhaps the owner did not install the software update he was notified 
about, which caused the vehicle not to recognize and react appropriately to the red traffic light.  
 
What if the owner did everything – replacing and cleaning the sensors, updating the software, frequently bring 
the vehicle to the garage to get it checked, etc. – that can be expected of him, is there a possibility to hold the 
manufacturer liable? For instance, if the accident is caused by a defective sensor, or by a programming failure in 
the software of the vehicle system? 
4.3. Liability of the manufacturer of (parts of) the vehicle 
If, for example, it turns out that the accident is caused by a defective sensor, the injured party could try to get 
compensation for his damage from the manufacturer of the sensor or the manufacturer of the entire vehicle. 
Within the European Union, the liability for a defective product is governed by Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 
1985 (Product Liability Directive). An in-depth study of the Directive goes beyond the scope of this paper, but a 
few issues will be discussed briefly below. 
 
Under this Directive, the manufacturer is liable for damage caused by a defect in its product (article 1 Product 
Liability Directive) (Van Dam (2013)). The injured party can decide who he wants to hold liable: the 
manufacturer of the sensor or the manufacturer of the entire vehicle (article 5 Product Liability Directive). 
Article 6 of the Product Liability Directive explains when a product is defective:  
 
“1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all 
circumstances into account, including: 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 
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2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into 
circulation.” 
 
The manufacturer is not liable if he proves, for example, that it is probable that the defect which caused the 
damage did not exist at the time when the product was put into circulation by him or that the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the 
existence of the defect to be discovered (article 7 Product Liability Directive)(Van Dam (2013)). A claim against 
the manufacturer of a defective sensor could, depending on the exact circumstances, well be successful.  
 
If it turns out the accident was caused by a flaw in the software, a different question arises: is software a 
‘product’ as meant in the Product Liability Directive? At the moment, this is unclear, but there is a tendency in 
literature to answer this question with ‘yes’ (Engelhard (2017), De Schrijver and Maas (2010), Reese (1994)). 
In the absence of a driver of the vehicle, liability for traffic accidents could shift from the driver to the 
manufacturers of the vehicles involved. This could have a negative effect on innovation as liability might hold 
manufacturers back from bringing their newest technology to the market (Schellekens (2015), Schrader (2016), 
Marchant and Lindor (2012)). 
4.4. Liability of the road authority 
An accident can be caused by a defective sensor or a flaw in the software, but it can also be caused by a problem 
with the road infrastructure. A traffic light that is not functioning the way it should, for example, or missing lane 
markings which can cause the autonomous vehicle to lose its orientation on the road. Depending on national 
legislation, the road authority responsible for maintaining the road infrastructure can be held liable for damage 
caused by the insufficient state of the infrastructure (Van Dam (2013)).  
4.5. Liability of the vehicle authority 
Another entity which, depending on national legislation, could be held liable for damage caused by autonomous 
vehicles is the authority responsible for approving and licensing vehicles for its domestic (and European: 
Directive 2007/46/EC) market. If the authority has approved an autonomous vehicle that is not in conformity 
with the applicable regulations, it could be liable for damage caused by that vehicle. This, again, depends on 
national legislation. 
5. More questions on the road ahead 
5.1. Fundamental rights 
In literature, the question has been raised if automated driving influences the exercising of fundamental rights 
(see for instance Stender-Vorwachs and Steege (2017)). A self-driving vehicle, to some extent, undermines the 
autonomy of its user as the driving decisions are made independent of the vehicle’s user (Boeglin (2015), Kohler 
and Colbert-Taylor (2015)). Gasser argues, regarding section 2 of the German Grundgesetz on rights relating to 
life and physical integrity, that the limitations on the right to personal freedom and personal mobility are not 
violated as long as the passengers can always cause the vehicle to stop at the nearest safe location (Gasser 
(2015)). On an international level, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union entails provisions 
similar to section 2 of the German Grundgesetz (see article 2 and 3 of the Charter)(Gasser (2015)). The 
interpretation given by Gasser can therefore be extended to constitutions of other jurisdictions (Gasser (2015)). 
However, Gasser points out that the fundamental rights framework can differ significantly in many areas and 
therefore caution is required (Gasser (2015)). 
5.2. Data recording 
It seems likely that self-driving vehicles will have some sort of ‘black box’ or event data recorder (EDR) to 
record data that is gathered by the vehicle. This data can be of use in reconstructing incidents, discovering faults 
in the functioning of the vehicle and it can be brought forward as evidence in a court case. However, what data 
and how much data will be collected is not yet clear (see for the current list of the data elements that should be 
recorded under the US Code of Federal Regulations: 49 CFR part 563). This raises concerns on the privacy of 
the persons using the vehicle (Glancy (2012)). It also raises the question who is allowed to access the data and if 
access to the data should be provided in case of a civil lawsuit or a criminal prosecution (Anderson et al (2016), 
Van Wees (2011)). 
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5.3. Ethical aspects 
There is increasingly more attention for the ethical questions surrounding the use of autonomous vehicles. The 
discussion mainly focusses on (a modified version) of the so-called Trolley Problem (Nyholm and Smids 
(2016)). If an accident is unavoidable whose lives should be sacrificed by the autonomous vehicle: the lives of its 
passengers,r the lives of other road users or should the vehicle be programmed in such a way that it makes the 
smallest number of casualties? (see also MIT’s Moral Machine: http://moralmachine.mit.edu/)? In 2016, the 
German government appointed an ethics commission to study ethical questions, including the Trolley Problem. 
This study has led to the publication of twenty rules on automated driving (Ethik-Kommission (2017)). In case 
of an unavoidable accident, so the commission, qualification according to personal characteristics is strictly 
prohibited (Ethik-Kommission (2017)). The commission also raises the question if at some point in time an 
obligation to use automated vehicles can be imposed and if such an obligation would be acceptable from an 
ethical point of view (Ethik-Kommission (2017)). 
6. On the road to a driverless future 
With technology developing further, more attention is paid to the legal challenges concerning autonomous 
vehicles. Within Working Party 1, several options to accommodate automated driving under the Conventions are 
being explored. A novel interpretation of certain terms in the Conventions, the amending of the Conventions, and 
drafting a Protocol, a Resolution or similar legal instrument are options that are being discussed 
(ECE/TRANS/WP.1/157, WP.1 (2016,), WP.1 (2017a), WP.1 (2017b), WP.1 (2017c) ). On a national level, 
governments are taking action as well. In Germany, modification of the Straßenverkehrsgesetz should provide 
clarity on which levels of automation our allowed under this law. A new Dutch bill (the so-called 
Experimenteerwet zelfrijdende auto, 2017) will, if it will be passed, open up the possibility to conduct trials on 
public roads without a human driver inside the self-driving vehicle. The United States of Transportation and the 
NHTSA have already published a two policy documents on automated driving (Federal Automated Vehicles 
Policy (2016), Automated Driving Systems (2017)) while in many American states automated vehicle legislation 
has been adopted (for instance in California, see Division 16.6 of the California Vehicle Code). So it seems legal 
developments are slowly but gradually catching up.  
To make more progress, the discussion should intensify. As is already the case to a certain degree, this 
discussion needs to take place at an international level, given the already existing harmonization (International 
level: the Geneva Convention and the Vienna Convention, on a European level: products liability Directive 
85/374/EEC, motor insurance Directive 009/103/EC, Directive 2007/46/EC on type-approval). This discussion 
should be interdisciplinary, with experts from outside the legal field providing legal experts and policymakers 
with more information on the capabilities of self-driving vehicles, ethical issues regarding self-driving vehicles, 
human-machine interaction, the impact of self-driving vehicles on the infrastructure, and so on. The findings 
from these different fields of expertise should be considered when drafting a legal framework. A legal 
framework can provide all the parties involved – local governments, users of self-driving vehicles, road users, 
manufacturers of self-driving vehicles, road authorities, etc. – with a clear picture of their rights and obligations, 
thereby contributing to the acceptance of self-driving vehicles. 
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